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I. Introduction 
The standard life-cycle model of consumption assumes that loans are always 
fully repaid,  even when future income is uncertain.  Zeldes  (1986)  shows that 
these two assumptions imply, in the context of constant relative risk 
aversion, that current consumption is very sensitive to current income.  He 
concludes that recent tests of the "excess" sensitivity of consumption 
spending to transitory income are erroneous because the "excess" sensitivity 
evident in the data is a natural outcome of the life-cycle model and not an 
indication of liquidity-constrained  behavior. 
This paper investigates the effects of dropping the assumption that loans 
are fully repaid with probability one.  It solves,  using stochastic dynamic 
programming,  a four-period,  life-cycle model of individual consumption 
behavior that includes the possibility of a Chapter 7  or liquidation 
bankruptcy.  One important characteristic of this model is that the 
partial-equilibrium effects of bankruptcy raise the demand for borrowing and 
current consumption.  This loosens the connection between current consumption 
and income,  thereby providing a rationale for using "excess" sensitivity of 
consumption to unexpected changes in current income as an indicator of 
liquidity-constrained behavior. 
Bankruptcy creates a discontinuous optimization problem for consumers.  A 
Chapter 7  bankruptcy implies a different set of consumption opportunities than 2 
the constraint imposed by the capital market.  Bankruptcy entails legal fees, 
the loss of some assets as payment to creditors, a tarnished credit rating, 
and possibly the social stigma associated with the failure to repay one's 
debts.  In return, bankruptcy reduces the amount of debts to be repaid,  stops 
wage garnishment and other legal actions of lenders,  and allows the bankrupt 
consumer to keep certain assets as a "fresh start" to life after bankruptcy. 
In the period of the bankruptcy filing,  a consumer optimizes with respect to 
the bankruptcy constraint,  which is different from the constraint he used 
before he filed for bankruptcy.  In the periods following the bankruptcy 
filing,  a consumer may again face different constraints if lenders tighten 
credit terms to former bankrupts. 
Along with bankruptcy, a second feature of the model is an endogenous 
borrowing rate of interest.  The borrowing interest rate is greater than the 
risk-free lending rate by the explicit default risk created by bankruptcy. 
The borrowing rate is endogenously set to equate loan demand with supply by 
the requirement that creditors expect to earn zero profits from lending to the 
consumer.  Thus,  the borrowing rate generally rises with the amount borrowed 
because greater borrowing raises expected loan losses,  directly through the 
amount borrowed and indirectly through the probability of default. 
The next section of this paper discusses the assumptions of the model. 
The third section describes the model's  structure.  The fourth section 
discusses the simulation  results,  and the last section provides summary and 
concluding remarks. 3 
11.  Assumptions of the Theoretical Model 
11.1.  Definition of Insolvency 
One precondition for bankruptcy is financial distress or insolvency, which 
may be defined as the inability to pay contractual obligations, such as 
mortgage and installment debts and insurance premiums,  in full on a timely 
basis.  Insolvency can arise for a number of reasons.  Unplanned 
income losses, spending needs, and interest-rate increases can place 
burdensome demands upon a consumer's financial resources.  Simple errors by 
consumers and lenders in evaluating the ability to repay debts also appear to 
be an important reason for insolvency.  For simplicity,  only 
contractual debt payments appear in the model. 
Note that insolvency is not defined here as the condition that debts are 
greater than assets.  Insolvency is a flow concept,  not a stock concept. 
Letting y  be labor income in period t,  A,  be the stock of assets owned in 
t 
period t,  and TLP, be total loan payments due in period t,  and excluding all 
taxes, a consumer is insolvent when discretionary funds  (DF,)  are strictly 
negative  : 
(1)  DF, = y,  + A, -  TLP, < 0. 11.2 Exogenous Income Uncertainty 
An  'obvious  necessary condition for insolvency is uncertainty about the 
future.  Without uncertainty,  consumers cannot borrow more than they can repay 
in some states of the world because their future income and creditworthiness 
are known to creditors.  Only uncertainty about future labor income is assumed 
here because it is the most important source of uncertainty to 
consumers.  Current-period income is known,  but all future income is 
unknown and is assumed to be independently distributed over time.  The 
probability density function of y  is denoted ft,  and is assumed 
t 
to be defined over strictly positive y  Min, and maxt are 
t. 
the minimum and maximum values of the income distribution.  Although the 
income probability density function is assumed to be exogenous to the 
consumer, the probability of insolvency is endogenous because current spending 
actions affect the ability to weather future income declines and,  hence,  to 
avoid bankruptcy. 
Although information is imperfect, it is symmetric.  Consumers know the 
credit-supply function,  and creditors know the consumer's reputation and 
income probability density functions.  Hence, there are no moral hazard or 
adverse selection problems of consumers intentionally borrowing more than can 
be repaid in every state of the world. 5 
11.3 No Alternatives to Bankruptcy 
A second precondition for bankruptcy is a lack of viable alternatives to 
bankruptcy.  Insolvency does not always lead to bankruptcy because the 
consumer may be able to refinance his debt with his current creditor or with a 
new creditor.  If the insolvency is more severe,  a consumer may be able to use 
the services of a consumer-credit  advisory service.  Many lenders will 
cooperate with these services in order to limit bankruptcy-related  costs and 
maintain valuable customer relationships.  Or,  an insolvent consumer may have 
the option of a wage-earner trusteeship,  such as the one administered by the 
Municipal Court in Cleveland,  Ohio, to forestall legal action and arrange a 
debt repayment plan. 
To isolate the response of the optimal consumption path to the possibility 
of bankruptcy, all of these alternatives will be ignored in this paper.  This 
restriction imposes a specific,  though not unreasonable,  assumption on lender 
behavior: all insolvent borrowers are forced into bankruptcy.  That is,  the 
consumer files for bankruptcy in period t if and only if Dl?,  < 0.  Gale and 
Hellwig  (1985)  show that this type of loan contract is incentive-compatible in 
a one-period model.  In the multiperiod model of this paper,  this may not be 
optimal lender behavior.  Indeed,  borrowers may be given a grace period to 
make up delinquent payments over time because bankruptcy is costly and hurts 
customer relations.  A more general model would allow the lender greater 
freedom in managing the loan,  but this feature would only obscure the main 
conclusions of the model. 
Voluntary bankruptcy is not allowed in order to keep the model simple. 6 
11.4  Chapter 7  Bankruptcy 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code is not truly bankruptcy,  but a 
court-sponsored debt repayment plan.  The full impact of limited liability is 
seen in Chapter 7,  which is used by the majority of consumers who file for 
bankruptcy.  Chapter 7 bankruptcy in this model takes a very simple form.  In 
return for a discharge of all current debts, the consumer must give creditors 
all financial assets,  plus current-period  labor income in excess of that 
period's minimum labor income.  That is,  the minimum value of the probability 
density function for labor income in the period of a bankruptcy filing is the 
consumer's exempt assets. 
11.5  One Bankruptcy per Lifetime 
To keep the analysis simple,  consumers may file for bankruptcy only once. 
This is not a severe restriction because only four periods are examined and 
the bankruptcy law prohibits successive Chapter 7 discharges within six years. 
This constraint is enforced by assuming that creditors restrict their lending 
to former consumer bankrupts.  The restriction takes the form of requiring 
consumers to repay all debts with probability one;  this is the standard Yaari 
(1964)  life-cycle model analyzed by Zeldes  (1986).  Without the possibility of 
default, the cost of borrowing after bankruptcy is the risk-free rate. 
This reduced borrowing opportunity is the main cost of bankruptcy in the 
model.  A more complete model would include other costs of bankruptcy,  such as 
the loss of nonexempt tangible assets. 11.6  The Characteristics of Assets and Debts 
Nonhuman assets are perfectly liquid, predictable,  and reversible 
financial assets that earn the risk-free  rate of interest (R-1).  Consumers 
may not own durable goods,  but may rent their services.  All debt is unsecured 
and finances spending on  nondurable goods and services.  There are no 
collateral requirements,  and no bequests. 
Given that the consumer files for bankruptcy when current income and 
assets do not cover current debt payments, the specification of loan 
maturities is very important.  Single-period loans imply a very strict 
bankruptcy rule,  and hence,  a strict constraint on  borrowing.  Moreover, 
multiperiod loans are the rule rather than the exception for consumer lending. 
Hence, the longest possible loan maturities are assumed: a loan taken out in 
the first period is repaid in equal installments over the following three 
periods;  a loan taken out in the second period is repaid over the following 
two periods;  a loan taken out in the third period is repaid in the fourth and 
last period.  Borrowing is not allowed in the last period, and loans cannot be 
prepaid. 
The periodic loan payment  (LP,)  for an N-period loan made in period 
t of size B,  is computed from the present value formula: 
(2)  B,  =  LP,/%  + LP,/R~~LP,/R~~  + . . .+ LP,/R:, 
where Rb is one plus the borrowing rate of interest. 
11.7  Zero-Profit  Credit Supply Constraint 
The key feature of this model is the possibility of less than full debt 
repayment in periods before bankruptcy.  The implication is that rational 8 
creditors must price default risk;  before bankruptcy, the supply of credit to 
consumers cannot be the perfectly elastic function of the risk-free rate of 
interest found in the Yaari life-cycle model. 
A conventional approach is to assume a perfectly competitive,  risk-neutral 
creditor who maximizes expected discounted profits.  Revenues are the 
contractual loan payments, plus any proceeds from a bankruptcy judgement,  and 
costs are the cost of funds.  There are no transactions costs, and the supply 
of funds available to creditors is perfectly elastic at the risk-free rate of 
interest. 
The credit-supply constraint is the first-order condition for maximizing 
discounted expected profits.  It equates the discounted expected cost of funds 
lent to the consumer with the discounted expected revenues from the loans, 
with the borrowing rate of interest as the equilibrating mechanism.  For 
simplicity,  only one borrowing rate is charged for borrowing in all periods 
before bankruptcy.  That is,  creditors make a contingent contract with 
borrowers that specifies one borrowing interest rate and the amounts to be 
borrowed in every state of the world each period before bankruptcy. 
The price of default risk thus is defined as the addition to the risk-free 
interest rate necessary to equate the discounted expected revenues from 
lending with the discounted expected cost of funds.  In general, the 
credit-supply curve will be upward sloping because additional borrowing raises 
expected loan losses.  Its slope will depend on the probability density 
functions of the consumer's labor income and on the demand for credit. 
The structure of the credit-supply constraint can be illustrated with a 
three-period problem and a two-point probability function for labor income. 9 
Let p  denote  the probability that income  in period t is low  (k=l) or 
t,k 
high  (k=2).  Assume  that bankruptcy  is impossible in the first period,  the 
optimal solution implies bankruptcy  in the low-income state in periods two  and 
three, borrowing  (B1)  occurs in the first period and borrowing 
(B2,2) occurs  in the high-income  state in period two,  and  that there are 
no  bequests.  The  consumer  repays  B1  in equal installments  (LP1) 
in the following two  periods and  B2,2  is fully repaid with interest in 
the third period.  The  debt payment  LP1  = B~(R~)~/(~+R~)  from  equation (2). 
Creditors match  the maturity of  their debts to their assets, repaying 
first-period borrowing  in equal installments of  CP1  in periods two  and 
three and  (R)(BZs2)  in period three.  Then  the discounted expected cost 
of  funds  to the creditor is: 
CP1/R  +  C~,/R~  + P2,,(R) (B~,~)/R~, 
and  the discounted expected return from lending is: 
(P  2.1 ) (Y2-min2)/R  +  (P~,~)  (LP1)/R  +  (pZJ2)  (P~,~)  (y3-min3)/RZ 
+ (P  2,2  (P  3.2  (LP1  +  (R)  (B~,J)/R'. 
If the consumer  owned  any  assets at the time of  the bankruptcy  filing, some 
portion of  these assets would  figure into the loan return. 
111. Model  Structure 
The  objective is to maximize  the expected present discounted value of 
utility from  consumption over  periods one  through T, which  is four.  The 
consumer begins with an endowment  of  human  and nonhuman  wealth,  never having 
filed for bankruptcy,  and  there is no  possibility of  bankruptcy  in the first 10 
period.  Current-period income is known when the consumption decision is made. 
Arrangements are made to borrow in the first three periods,  and the cost of 
borrowing may rise with the amount of borrowing.  There is no inflation and no 
taxes. 
The structure of the model can be understood by imagining a solution tree 
in discrete time.  The initial branch of the tree is followed over 
time unless the consumer cannot meet all of his debt payments.  If forced into 
bankruptcy, the consumer moves onto a new branch of the tree where bankruptcy 
costs are paid and all debts at the time of the bankruptcy filing are 
discharged.  Once on this new branch, the consumer can never leave it; the 
consumer faces a strict borrowing constraint that excludes the possibility of 
additional bankruptcy filings.  Clearly,  the solutions along these 
post-bankruptcy branches are independent of those along the initial branch, 
but not vice versa. 
The four-period solution tree is shown in figure 1.  The nodes along each 
branch are labelled (  t  ,  j  ) , where t denotes the time period and j  denotes the 
branch number.  Branch 0  is the initial branch where bankruptcy is never 
filed.  A branch number greater than 0 refers to the post-bankruptcy branches 
and indicates the period in which the consumer filed for bankruptcy.  For 
example, the coordinate (3,2)  refers to the third period along branch number 
two and indicates that the consumer filed for bankruptcy in period two.  Thus, 
the time index t is greater than or equal to j  along any post-bankruptcy 
branch.  This notation will be used in the formal model specification below. 
The model is structured as a two-state,  dynamic programming problem with 
two sets of constraints.  The two-state variables are discretionary funds and a bankruptcy indicator variable that denotes the period of a bankruptcy 
filing.  For notational convenience,  these two-state  variables can be co~nbined 
into one, DFttj,,  which denotes discretionary funds at time t along 
branch j,  using the above notation.  Consistent with the earlier definition, 
DFt,j  = Yt +  -  TLP,,  j, where A,-,,  is 
financial assets in period t-1  along branch j and TLPtPj  is total loan 
payments due in period t along branch j.  The two sets of constraints are the 
zero-profit credit supply constraint and the constraints on consumption in the 
various states.  The control variables are new borrowing and new acquisitions 
of financial assets for each state of the world in each period. 
Let V(DFtPj)  denote the maximum present discounted value of utility 
from period t to T along branch j.  For the post-bankruptcy branches  (j  > 0) 
and t < T, 
max U  (mint+Bt,  -At,  ) +SEV  (DFt+,,  ) ,  t = j  >  0 
B  ,A 
(3) V(DFt,j) = 
max U(DFt,  j+Bt, -4,  j)+6EV(DFt+l,  j),  t > j >O 
B ,A 
for nonzero j and t = T, 
U(mi9)  for T = j, 
V(DFT,j)  = 
U(DFTSj)  for T>  j >0; 
where S is the inverse of 1 plus the rate of time preference;  B,,j  is new 
borrowing on branch j during period t;  U()  is the utility of consumption 
function,  defined over nonnegative consumption and twice differentiable with U' > 
0,  U" < 0; E  is the expectation operator over labor income.  In the period of 
the bankruptcy filing  (t  = j), consumption equals exempt assets plus new 
borrowing because previous-period net wealth was eliminated by the bankruptcy 
filing.1° In  the periods following a bankruptcy filing  (t  > j)  , 
consumption equals labor income,  plus new borrowing,  minus total loan payments due in the period,  minus new saving in the financial asset.  There is no decision 
in the last period because there is no bequest motive. 
Apart from the shift in the consumption constraint in the period of a 
bankruptcy filing,  (3)  is essentially the simple Yaari  (1964)  model with perfect 
capital markets; discretionary funds are always strictly greater than zero along 
these branches.  The maximum expected present discounted value of utility,  from 
period j  to T,  along branch j > 0 will be denoted as PDWBrj 
For the solutions of interest along the initial branch  (j  = 0) and t < T, 
subject to the zero-profit,  credit-supply constraint,  where 
For t = T, 
The transition equation for the state variable DFtJj  is 
DF,,  = 
mint  ,  j=t, 
where D is the difference operator and DTLP,,  = LP,, j. 
The major difference between equations  (3)  and (4)  lies in the EV() 
terms.  Because there is no possibility of bankruptcy along the 
post-bankruptcy branches,  the future utility term assumes a simple form in 
equation  (3).  However,  the possibility of a future bankruptcy filing is a key 
element of the branch 0  decision problem.  The consumer must balance certain 
consumption today with uncertain consumption tomorrow,  where the uncertainty 13 
about tomorrow's consumption is complicated by the possibility of bankruptcy. 
If the consumer never borrows enough to raise the probability of bankruptcy 
above zero,  equation  (4)  reduces to the simple Yaari life-cycle model. 
The probability of bankruptcy in each period,  P,,  is defined as 
follows.  Because income is independently distributed over time,  the 
probability,  Q,,  reaching node (t,O), for any period t,  is simply the 
product of the marginal probabilities of nonnegative discretionary funds 
during the first t periods: 
The probability of filing for bankruptcy in period t is the product of 
the probability of not filing for bankruptcy in the first t-1  periods and the 
probability that discretionary funds are negative period t: 
P, = Q,-,[Pr(DF,,o  < 0)1, 
where the bracketed term on the right is defined to be one when t is one. 
Note that the sum of P,  and Q,  is not one.  The difference is the 
probability of filing for bankruptcy sometime before period t 
It is interesting to note that the specification of the dynamic program 
implicitly uses these conditional densities in the formation of the 
expectations.  This is readily apparent by expanding all of the terms of 
equation  (4)  and writing the objective function as the discounted sum of 
expected utility.  The reason comes from the nonlinear shift in the program 
after bankruptcy.  The probability of following a particular path in the tree, 
that is,  obtaining a particular level of utility,  depends on previous and 
current actions.  For example, the probability of obtaining the utility value 
from branch two  (bankruptcy  in the second period) in period four is the 14 
probability of a bankruptcy filing in the second period times the density 
function of income in the fourth period. 
IV. Simulation Results 
Because a general,  closed-form solution does not exist for this problem, 
numerical solution of a particular specification is the only feasible solution 
technique.  The utility function of the simulation model is assumed to exhibit 
constant relative risk aversion: 
U(Ci,  j)  =  (l/(l-A))  (Ci,  j)l-A. 
In accordance with estimation results reported by Zeldes (1986),  the value of 
A is three in all the simulations.  The rate of time preference is 20.0 
percent, the risk-free rate of interest is five percent,  and initial wealth is 
zero.  The probability density function of y  is assumed to be a 
t 
three-point  , discrete distribution,  with 
Yt,i 
=  (Meany,) ei  ,  for i=1,2,3, 
where Meany, is the mean value of y  and ei  is an  t' 
independent,  identically distributed random variable with a mean of one and a 
probability function: 
ei  probability 
The Meany, values are: 
Period  Me  any 
------  - - - - - 
1  100 
2  250 
3  400 
4  200. 15 
A symmetric distribution for ei  was chosen for simplicity,  and the 
MeanY, values were chosen to mimic a textbook life-cycle income 
profile  . 
Details of the simulation model and its solution are given in Kowalewski 
(1989). 
IV.l Baseline Simulation 
There are four main characteristics of the bankruptcy model.  First, 
relative to the Yaari model, the possibility of bankruptcy shifts consumption 
from periods late in the life cycle to periods early in the life cycle.  As 
shown in table 1,  first-period consumption in the bankruptcy model simulation 
is about 39 percent greater than first-period consumption in the Yaari model, 
and the mean value of second-period  consumption is over 14  percent greater. 
Indeed,  the time pattern of consumption in the bankruptcy model is similar to 
that of the certainty equivalent model,  also shown in table 1.  Consumption is 
shifted from late to early periods in the life cycle when the rate of time 
preference is greater than the rate of interest. l1  This stands in 
sharp contrast to expected consumption in the Yaari model,  which is more 
closely correlated with labor income. 
Second,  bankruptcy's role as insurance  (Arrow  1971) against adverse labor 
income draws lowers the variance of consumption in every period.  The variance 
of consumption is about 52 percent less in the second period,  almost 31 
percent less in the third period,  and about 10 percent less in the last 
period. 
Third, the present value of expected future utility is greater in the 
bankruptcy model than in the Yaari model. 16 
Finally,  default risk drives a wedge between the borrowing and risk-free 
rate of interest.  The optimal amount of borrowing in the bankruptcy model 
implies a nonzero probability of bankruptcy in all future periods,  with the 
probabilities falling over time.  In the second period,  bankruptcy occurs with 
a probability of 0.02,  when the minimum value of labor income results.  In the 
third period,  bankruptcy occurs with a probability of 0.0192,  when 
second-period labor income is its mean value and third-period labor income is 
its minimum value.  Bankruptcy occurs in the fourth period with a probability 
of 0.000008,  when second-period labor income is its largest value and both 
third-  and fourth-period labor income are their minimum values.  These 
probabilities create a wedge of 1.725 percentage points between the borrowing 
and lending rates of interest in the baseline simulation. l2 
IV.2 Chanees in the Risk-Free Rate of Interest 
Increases in the risk-free  rate will raise the borrowing rate of interest 
directly and indirectly through the default risk premium.  This section 
discusses the impact of changes in the risk-free rate of interest,  with all of 
the other parameters held at their baseline values.  Seven experiments were 
run using odd values of the risk-free rate between 1 and 13 percent.  The 
results are shown in table 2. 
The top half of table 2 shows that the borrowing rate and the risk premium 
increase with the risk-free rate.  The relationship between either the risk 
premium or the borrowing rate of interest and the risk-free rate is linear in 
this range.  A 2 percentage point increase in the risk-free rate raises the 
risk premium by 0.04 percentage point and the borrowing rate by 2.04 
percentage points.  The linearity of these relationships is partly due to the 17 
assumption of symmetric information.  Models with adverse selection,  for 
example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), would show a nonlinear relationship between 
the risk-free rate and the borrowing rate of interest.  At some sufficiently 
great interest rate in these models, it is optimal to ration credit by 
quantity and not by price. 
Another reason why the relationships are linear is that the probabilities 
of bankruptcy in all future periods do not vary across the simulations.  The 
simple, three-point probability function for labor income leaves ample room 
for borrowing to vary without a change in the probabilities of bankruptcy.  If 
the income probability function were continuous and not uniform, the 
relationships would not be linear,  with successive increases in the risk-free 
rate implying ever-larger increases in the risk premium and in the borrowing 
rate of interest. 
The bottom half of table 2 compares the elasticities of first-period 
borrowing and consumption with respect to the risk-free rate in the bankruptcy 
and Yaari models.  The Yaari results assume borrowing and lending rates are 
equal to the risk-free rate of five percent.  The elasticities for both 
borrowing and consumption are negative and quite small for both models over 
this range of risk-free interest rates.  First-period borrowing in the 
bankruptcy model is less sensitive to changes in the risk-free rate than i.t is 
in the Yaari model. l3  First-period consumption is slightly more 
elastic in the bankruptcy model,  but the differences in the two sets of 
elasticities is very small.  Indeed,  the difference between the consumption 
elasticities is too small to serve reliably as the basis of an  econometric 
test of the two models. IV.3  Changes in Initial Wealth 
The baseline results indicate that the possibility of bankruptcy loosens 
the relationship between income and consumption found in the Yaari model.  As 
a corollary, the possibility of bankruptcy generally will lower the marginal 
propensity to consume  (MPC)  changes in initial wealth.  Table 3(a)  displays 
the MPCs of the bankruptcy,  Yaari,  and certainty-equivalence models.  The 
far left column of the table shows first-period income levels used for the 
simulations.  The MPCs for each model were computed by dividing the successive 
differences of these income levels into the successive differences of their 
corresponding first-period consumption levels. 
The differences among these MPCs are rather dramatic.  Although the values 
of first- and second-period  consumption shown in table 1 are very close in the 
bankruptcy and certainty-equivalence  models, the MPCs of the two models are 
very dissimilar.  The MPCs of the certainty-equivalence  model are the lowest 
of the three models and are constant across income values.  The MPCs of the 
Yaari model are the largest,  except when labor income is 175,  and they fall 
monotonically as income rises.  The MPCs from the bankruptcy model generally 
fall between those of the other two models and show an irregular pattern as 
income rises.  They rise from 0.321,  when income is 50,  to 0.537 when income 
is 100.  They fall for the next two income values,  rise when income is 175, 
and fall when income is 200.  When income is 225,  the MPC is negative and less 
than 1,  but it  increases for income value 250.  l4 
The irregular pattern of the MPCs from the bankruptcy model is due to the 
possibility of bankruptcy,  and not to the endogenous borrowing rate of 
interest.  This should be clear from the low interest rate elasticities shown 
in table 2.  Moreover, table 3(b)  compares the MPCs from the bankruptcy model 19 
when the borrowing rate is endogenous with those from the bankruptcy model 
when the borrowing rate is exogenously fixed at the risk-free  rate of five 
percent.  The MPCs assuming an exogenous borrowing rate have a greater 
variance,  suggesting that the endogenous borrowing rate moderates the 
consumption response of the model. 
Table 4  shows how the borrowing interest rate, the probabilities of 
bankruptcy,  expected borrowing,  and expected consumption  change as 
first-period  labor income changes.  For example,  when income increases fro111  25 
to 50,  first-period borrowing falls 16.972 units,  expected second-period 
borrowing increases 1.187 units,  and so on.  The same interpretation holds for 
the consumption  changes.  The levels of consumption  and borrowing are shown 
for income equal to 25.  Borrowing is either the purchase of new debt or new 
financial assets;  a negative value of borrowing indicates saving in a 
financial asset  . 
The time pattern of expected consumption varies greatly as first-period 
income increases.  For income values 50 and 75,  increases in income are fairly 
well-spread across time.  The changes are front-loaded because the rate of 
time preference is greater than the borrowing interest rate.  For income 
values 100 to 200,  most of the change in expected consumption occurs in the 
first two periods.  When income is 225,  it is close to the expected value of 
second-period income and it shifts expected consumption away from the first 
two periods.  First-period  consumption falls by 27.3 units,  producing the 
negative MPC;  second-period expected consumption falls 31.1 units;  and 
third- and fourth-period  expected consumption increase by 54.9 and 37.1 units, 
respectively.  This shift in expected consumption implies a shift in expected 
borrowing,  which lowers the probability of bankruptcy in the second period and 20 
thi borrowing rate of interest by 88 basis points.  When income is 250,  the 
change in income again is fairly well-spread across time.  Indeed,  expected 
consumption is fairly even across time,  as shown in table 3(c). 
Table 4  also shows the impact of the discrete nature of the labor income 
probability function.  Between income values 25 and 125,  the borrowing rate 
falls slightly with the amount of first-period  borrowing because the 
probabilities of bankruptcy remain unchanged.  When income is 150,  the 
borrowing rate falls a relatively large amount because the drop in the demand 
for borrowing in the first period lowers the probability of bankruptcy in the 
second period from 0.02 to zero.  The borrowing rate increases slightly for 
the next two income values before it falls,  with the probability of bankruptcy 
in the third period,  at income value 225.  For all income values except 175, 
200,  and 250,  the borrowing rate falls with first-period borrowing.  This 
surprising result may be due to the fact that the credit-supply constraint is 
an inverse cubic equation.  This nonlinearity may give the distribution of 
borrowing across time and states of nature a large impact on the borrowing 
rate of interest  . 
IV.4 Changes in the Probability Density Function of Labor Income 
Changes in the probability density function of labor income may have two 
effects.  First,  a known change in the variance of future income will lead 
risk-averse consumers to shift the time pattern of consumption.  Second, a 
known change in the probabilities of bankruptcy will change the borrowing rate 
of interest.  In particular,  an increase in the probability of a bad income 
draw will raise the borrowing interest rate and shift consumption from early 
to later periods in the life cycle. 2  1 
Table 5 displays the results from symmetrically increasing the tails of 
the ei distribution,  and compares the first-period borrowing and 
consumption elasticities in the bankruptcy and Yaari models.  The top half of 
table 5 indicates that the borrowing rate of interest is a positive function 
of the tail probability.  The bottom half of the table indicates that the 
resulting shifts in first-period borrowing and consumption are extremely small 
in the bankruptcy model. 22 
IV.5  Changes in the Cost of Bankruptcy 
An increase in the cost of bankruptcy in this model will lower the demand 
for borrowing and hence the borrowing rate of interest.  In the aggregate,  a 
greater cost of bankruptcy will lower average bankruptcy filings.  The easiest 
way to change the cost of bankruptcy in this model is to change the amount of 
labor income that may be kept by the consumer after bankruptcy.  Table 6 
displays the results of allowing the consumer to keep 25,  50,  75,  and 100 
percent of his minimum labor income after bankruptcy. 
The results indicate that as the cost of bankruptcy increases,  the demand 
for borrowing and the borrowing rate of interest decrease.  The magnitudes of 
the differences should not be taken as reasonable estimates of real-world 
impacts.  The small difference between the results for exempt assets fractions 
0.25 and 0.50,  and that for 0.74 and 1.00,  are due to the small size of exempt 
assets.  The baseline simulation assumes that exempt assets are 100 percent of 
the minimum value of the labor-income distribution in the period of the 
bankruptcy filing.  These minimum values are already small numbers,  and taking 
fractions of them yields small changes.  The relatively large difference 
between the results for exempt-asset fractions 0.50  and 0.75 again is due to 
the discrete nature of the labor income density function. 
The results in table 6  square with the increase in consumer bankruptcy 
filings after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 became effective in October, 
1979.  This act lowered the cost of bankruptcy to consumers,  and came at a 
time when real consumer income growth was slowing,  debt burdens were high,  and 
portfolios were very illiquid.  l5  Initially, the sharp increase in 
bankruptcy filings was due to the insolvent consumers at the margin.  l6 
Since then,  consumer bankruptcy filings have remained at an historically 23 
high level because lower bankruptcy costs increased consumer willingness to 
borrow,  which was accommodated by consumer lenders. l7 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper develops and analyzes a life-cycle model that incorporates the 
possibility of insolvency and its resolution  with bankruptcy.  Insolvency is 
defined as the inability to repay debts in full out of current income and 
nonhuman wealth.  After-tax labor income is an exogenous random variable,  but 
the probability of insolvency is endogenous to the consumer.  The consumer 
maximizes the present discounted value of expected utility subject to the 
usual cash flow constraint and a zero-profit  credit supply constraint,  which 
equates the demand and supply of credit with the borrowing rate of interest. 
Loan maturities are generally not one-period,  but the number of periods 
remaining in the life cycle when the loans are made. 
Once insolvent,  the consumer is immediately forced into a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy by creditors.  There are two costs of bankruptcy in the model.  One 
is the payment of the delinquent debts with any current-period income greater 
than its minimum value that period, plus any nonhuman assets.  The other,  more 
important cost, is a change in the borrowing constraint: after bankruptcy, all 
debts must be repaid with probability one.  In return for these costs, the 
bankrupt consumer is discharged from all debts. 
The relaxed credit-supply  constraint in the bankruptcy model loosens the 
dependence of current consumption on current income relative to that in the 
Yaari model.  The time path of expected consumption closely follows that of 
expected labor income in the Yaari model.  The time path of consumption in the 24 
bankruptcy model is less closely related to that of income,  but it is not 
divorced as in the certainty equivalence model.  Indeed, the marginal 
propensities to consume in the bankruptcy model generally lie between those of 
the certainty equivalence and Yaari models.  An interesting feature of the 
model is that the marginal propensity to consume may be negative,  as increases 
in current income shift consumption from periods early in the life cycle to 
later ones. 
Increases in the risk-free  rate of interest raise the borrowing rate of 
interest and lower the demand for borrowing.  The elasticities of current 
consumption with respect to the risk-free rate are small and only marginally 
larger than those of the Yaari life-cycle model.  Increases in the variance of 
future labor income,  or equivalently,  increases in the probability of 
bankruptcy, increase the borrowing rate of interest and lower the demand for 
borrowing.  Finally,  an increase in the cost of bankruptcy lowers the demand 
for borrowing and the borrowing interest rate. 
The findings of this paper provide support for the strategy of testing for 
the "excess sensitivity" of current consumption to unexpected changes in 
current income  (see  Kowalewski [1985b]).  Zeldes  (1986)  has argued that these 
tests are invalid because they assume certainty equivalence,  which reduces the 
income sensitivity of consumption.  His computer simulations,  and those in 
this paper,  show that the excess sensitivity is a characteristic of the Yaari 
model without certainty equivalence.  Adding bankruptcy to the Yaari model 
without certainty equivalence reduces the income sensitivity of consumption, 
thereby adding support to the research strategy.  Nevertheless,  the findings 25 
of the "excess sensitivity" papers may be biased because the 
certainty-equivalence model is not a good approximation to the model with 
bankruptcy. 
The model of this paper can be extended in four important ways.  One is 
the addition of tangible assets.  The loss of certain tangible assets in 
bankruptcy is an important cost of bankruptcy, especially if liquidity 
constraints tighten after bankruptcy. 
A second extension makes consumption needs a stochastic variable. 
Accidents and medical problems are an important source of financial problems 
for consumers who file for bankruptcy.  Stochastic consumption needs would 
lower the demand for borrowing and increase the sensitivity of current 
consumption to changes in current income. 
A third extension is the allowance for asymmetric information.  The risk 
premia found in this paper are very small because they capture the uncertainty 
only about future income,  not about the distribution of income or the 
integrity of the borrower.  The addition of asymmetric information would 
increase the risk premia and would provide an estimate of the value of 
information to creditors. 
Finally,  another extension is the allowance for general equilibrium.  This 
requires,  at a minimum, that the cost of funds paid by creditors rise with the 
amount of borrowing. FIGURE 1 
FOUR-PERIOD SOLUTION TREE 
Period  0  1  2  3  4 
Source  :  Author BASELINE SIMULATION RESULTS 
BANKRUPTCY AND YAARI MODELS 
Expected  Consumption 
Expected  Certainty 
Period  Income  Bankruv  tcv  Yaari  Equivalence 
1  100  248.761  178.982  249.867 
2  250  235.353  205.586  238.990 
3  400  214.555  278.386  228.585 
4  200  238.656  285.228  218.634 
Variance of  Probability 
Expected Consumption  of 
Period  Bankruvtcv  Yaari  Bankruv  tcv 
1  NA  NA  NA 
2  325.634  674.586  0.020000 
3  1118.576  1614.701  0.019200 
4  1612.294  1783.803  0.000008 
Present Discounted Value of Expected Future Utility 
Bankru~tcv  Yaar  i 
-3.03939E-5  -3.846273-5 
Interest Rates in the Bankruptcy Model 
Borrowing  Risk-  Free 
6.725%  5.000% 
Source: Author TABLE 2 
THE RISK-FREE  RATE OF INTEREST SIMULATIONS 
The Relationship Between the Risk-free Rate 
and the Borrowing Rate 
























Risk-free Interest Rate Elasticities for 











NA  NA 
-0.015  -0.009 
-  0.040  -  0.024 
-0.076  -  0.045 
-0.097  -0.057 
-0.119  -0.069 
-0.139  -0.080 
YAARI MODEL 
Borrowing Consumtion 
NA  NA 
-0.017  -0.008 
-0.050  -0.023 
-0.083  -0.036 
-0.114  -  0.049 
-0.145  -0.062 
-0.175  -0.073 
Source:  Author TABLE 3 
MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME 
CHANGES IN INITIAL WEALTH 
First-Period 
Income 
2  5 
50 





































































Period  100  150  200  225  250 
1  248.761  273.981  297.487  270.181  278.146 
2  235.353  264.655  291.416  260.315  267.886 
3  214.555  212.978  213.014  267.964  274.132 
4  238.656  236.694  237.821  274.963  279.860 
Source:  Author TABLE 4 
CHANGES IN INITIAL WEALTH 
BANKRUPTCY MODEL 
Borrowing  Probability  Change in  Change in 
Interest  of  Expected  Expected 
Income  Rate  Period  Bankru~tcv  Borrowing  Consum~tion 
2  5  6.748%  1  0.00000  193.196*  218.196* 
2  0.02000  29.124*  207.311* 
3  0.01920  -111.779*  202.083* 
4  0.00001  0.  OOO*  231.230* 
50  6.744%  1  0.00000  - 16.972  8.028 
2  0.02000  1.187  7.501 
3  0.01920  1.418  6.968 
4  0.00001  0.000  4.061 
7  5  6.737%  1  0.00000  -15.890  9.110 
2  0.02000  2.626  8.539 
3  0.01920  1.037  5.418 
4  0.00001  0.000  3.291 
100  6.725%  1  0.00000  -11.573  13.427 
2  0.02000  7.689  12.002 
3  0.01920  0.007  0.087 
4  0.00001  0.000  0.073 
125  6.711%  1  0.00000  -12.360  12.640 
2  0.02000  8.212  12.818 
3  0.01920  0.007  0.093 
4  0.00001  0.000  0.079 
150  5.891%  1  0.00000  -12.421  12.579 
2  0.00000  12.106  16.484 
3  0.01960  0.189  -1.670 
4  0.00039  0.000  - 2.041 
175  5.924%  1  0.00000  -  11.814  13.186 
2  0.00000  7.731  12.116 
3  0.01960  0.032  0.187 
4  0.00039  0.000  0.122 
200  5.964%  1  0.00000  -14.680  10.320 
2  0.00000  9.188  14.646 
3  0.01960  -0.571  -0.151 
4  0.00001  0.000  1.005 
225  5.084%  1  0.00000  -52.305  -27.305 
2  0.00000  -50.931  -31.101 
3  0.00040  8.704  54.949 
4  0.00039  0.000  37.143 
250  5.105%  1  0.00000  -17.035  7.965 
2  0.00000  1.310  7.571 
3  0.00040  0.619  6.168 
4  0.00039  0.000  4.897 
*Levels 
Source:  Author TABLE 5 
THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE PROBABILITY 










Variance  Rate 
0.025  6.725% 
0.050  8.500% 
0.074  10.326% 
0.099  12.201% 
0.124  14.125% 



















Borrowing  Consum~tion 
NA  NA 
-0.020  -  0.045 
-0.034  -  0.046 
-0.057  -0.061 
- 0.064  -0.059 

















Source:  Author TABLE 6 
CHANGES IN THE COST OF BANKRUPTCY 
Exempt  Borrowing 
Asset  Interest 
Percentage  -  Borrowing  Consumvtion  Rate 
25.0%  128.926  228.926  5.04862% 
50.0%  128.978  228.978  5.04877% 
75.0%  148.692  248.692  6.72473% 
100.0%  148.761  248.761  6.72481% 
Source:  Author FOOTNOTES  3  3 
'some  consumer lenders argue that insolvency is no longer a precondition 
for bankruptcy.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 removed all legal 
preconditions for bankruptcy, and many lenders feel that the large increase in 
personal bankruptcy filings after the Act became effective in October,  1979 is 
evidence that consumers have abused the law by taking advantage of this change 
and the Act's liberalized exemption limits.  Nevertheless, the solution of 
this abuser problem is trivial and will be ignored. 
2~ee  for example,  Stanley and Girth  (1971). 
30ther sources of uncertainty are possible but complicate the analysis. 
Stochastic consumption  needs raises the possibility of multiple bankruptcy 
filings per lifetime, which greatly increases the number of solutions required 
for a problem of given horizon length.  Adding stochastic interest rates 
magnifies the "curse of dimensionality." 
4~ee  Kowalewski  (1982)  for a description of this and other alternatives to 
bankruptcy. 
5~oreover,  a "grace period" variation is a trivial debt restructuring 
problem unless there is uncertainty about the availability of the grace 
period. 
6  Due to asymmetric information,  it is likely that consumers must pay a 
greater interest rate after bankruptcy.  The use of the risk-free rate is a 
logical consequence of the assumed borrowing restriction;  it is not an crucial 
assumption  because the disutility from the borrowing restriction more than 
offsets the utility from a lower borrowing rate.  A more complete model would 
allow multiple bankruptcies and greater borrowing interest rates after 
bankruptcy  . 
70ne interest rate for all borrowing before bankruptcy is not restrictive 
because there is no moral hazard or adverse selection problems.  A more 
realistic assumption would be asymmetric information, which would admit the 
possibility of credit rationing and time-varying interest rates before 
bankruptcy.  Learning behavior by creditors would be a desirable and 
complementary feature to add to the model. The assumption of symmetric 
information is a useful first step that helps to isolate the impact of limited 
liability. 
'using  a simple portfolio balance approach, the default premium also may be 
defined as the extra percentage return necessary to equate the discounted 
expected loan return with the discounted return from lending the same amount 
at the risk-free rate of interest.  Note that this default premium is not a 
risk premium as defined by Pratt  (1964)  because the utility of profits 
function is linear in profits. 
 he  decision-tree framework of this model is similar to those of Foley and 
Hellwig  (1975)  and Watkins  (1978).  Both take the same view of a consumer 
following a tree of consumption  opportunities,  whose branches are determined 
by discrete,  nonlinear changes in the intertemporal budget set.  These changes 
are determined by the employment status of the consumer,  which is an FOOTNOTES  3  4 
exogenous,  stochastic process;  insolvency and bankruptcy are ignored. 
1°1t  may seem odd that the consumer is allowed to borrow in the period of a 
bankruptcy filing.  However,  it is logically consistent given the assumption 
of symmetric information  and the constraint that all debts incurred after 
bankruptcy are fully repaid with probability one.  Prohibiting borrowing in 
the period of a bankruptcy filing would magnify the impact of bankruptcy in 
the simulation results shown below. 
'%he  increase in expected consumption in the last period of the bankruptcy 
model may be due to the lower probability of bankruptcy in that period. 
12~he  size of this wedge may seem small until it is realized that the wedge 
is only the default premium under symmetric information,  and does not include 
transactions costs or the additional costs created by asymmetric information. 
13~he  interest-rate elasticities are somewhat larger if the borrowing rate 
is used. 
14iilthough  the MPCs from the bankruptcy and Yaari models are different at 
these income levels, it is likely that the MPCs from the bankruptcy model 
approach,  and eventually equal,  those of the Yaari model as first-period 
income increases without limit.  With sufficiently great first-period income, 
the consumer will have no need to borrow more than he would have if he was 
required,  as in the Yaari model, to repay all debts with probability one. 
15see Kowalewski  (1982)  for a discussion of the financial position of 
households in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
16~he  initial sharp increase also may be due to consumers anticipating the 
passage of the act.  These consumers may have postponed a bankruptcy filing in 
order to file under the new act or increased their borrowing before the 
effective date of the act. 
17~he  strength in consumer borrowing since 1982 is discussed in Kowalewski 
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